Altruistic punishment is often thought to be a major enforcement mechanism of social norms. I present experimental results from a modified version of the dictator game with third-party punishment, in which third parties can remain ignorant about the choice of the dictator. I find that a substantial fraction of subjects choose not to reveal the dictator's choice and not to punish the dictator. I show that this behavior is in line with the social norms that prevail in a situation of initial ignorance. Remaining ignorant and choosing not to punish is not inappropriate. As a result, altruistic punishment is significantly lower when the dictator's choice is initially hidden. The decrease in altruistic punishment leads to more selfish dictator behavior only if dictators are explicitly informed about the effect of willful ignorance on punishment rates. Hence, in scenarios in which third parties can ignore information and dictators know what this implies, third-party punishment may only ineffectively enforce social norms.
Introduction
A large and inuential strand of literature shows that individuals are willing to punish other individuals if they violate social norms, even if the punishment comes at a monetary cost and yields no material gain (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Carpenter, 2007; Carpenter and Matthews, 2012) . Some of these studies show that this altruistic punishment of norm violations is even conducted by third parties, whose own economic payo is unaected by the norm violation. The willingness to altruistically punish norm violations has been suggested as being one major enforcement mechanism of social norms. In turn, social norms that are enforced by social sanctions are seen as a key driver of cooperation between strangers, individuals' willingness to be generous, and the existence of human societies more generally.
1 Social preferences are thought to be the reason for third-party punishment: Unaected third parties punish subjects who violate norms, although it is costly and they receive no material benet from it. They do so, presumably, because they expect a benet for others.
2
However, more recent studies emphasize that people willfully ignore information and in turn exploit ambiguities about the consequences of their actions. In a seminal paper by Dana et al. (2007) and a plethora of follow-up studies (Larson and Capra, 2009; Cain and Dana, 2012; Grossman, 2014; Feiler, 2014; van der Weele, 2014; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017; Moradi and Nesterov, 2017) , it is shown that dictator game-giving declines when subjects can choose not to reveal how their actions aect a passive recipient's payo.
3
It is an open question whether people's tendency to remain ignorant in order to avoid costly moral behavior might also lower their willingness to altruistically punish norm violations. At the same time, one can think of many real-world scenarios in which willful ignorance might impact altruistic punishment. A university professor supervising an exam might prefer to look away rather than check carefully whether a student brought a forbidden cheat sheet, knowing that if she found the cheat sheet she would need to engage in a nervewracking discussion with the cheating student and exclude him from writing the exam. A restaurant manager who suspects that one of his waitresses is not sharing her tips with her colleagues as agreed upon, might be reluctant to check, because nding out that the waitress was not sharing her tips would imply the need to confront her, which would have detrimental eects on the working atmosphere and, ultimately, his prots. And, when a rm asks to be 1 In this vein, the ndings on altruistic punishment have shaped research in various elds such as economics, biology, anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience.
2 Third-party punishment can also be consistent with inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or spite (Levine, 1998) , see also Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2012). 3 In more applied settings, Kandul (2016) and Kajackaite (2015) also document that subjects remain willfully ignorant in order to make selsh decisions.
2 paid for its services without providing an invoice, people might refrain from asking for the invoice and from checking whether it contains the total amount even though they would nd it unfair if the rm were to evade taxes because asking might increase the amount one has to pay oneself.
To study the eect of willful ignorance on third-party punishment, I run a laboratory experiment in which I modify the dictator game with third-party punishment (third-party punishment game; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) . The game consists of two stages, each played by a group of three players: a dictator, a recipient, and a third party. In the rst stage, the dictator decides between a selsh option, giving him a high payo and the recipient a low payo, or a fair option that gives a lower payo to the dictator but a higher payo to the recipient. In the second stage, the third party whose payo is unaected by the dictator's choice, has the opportunity to punish the dictator. I vary whether the third party always observes the dictator's choice prior to making its decision (baseline treatment) or can choose to reveal it at no cost (hidden information treatment).
I nd that a substantial fraction (36%) of third parties avoid learning the choice of the dictator in the hidden information treatment. These third parties act as if the dictator has chosen the fair option. Dictators who choose the fair option are almost never punished. As a result, the fraction of subjects choosing to altruistically punish a selsh dictator is signicantly lower when the information about the dictator's behavior is initially unobserved compared to when it is exogenously provided: The frequency of altruistic punishment decreases by 50%. Hence, the possibility to avoid information diminishes third-party punishment.
Surprisingly, although this drastic decrease in altruistic punishment signicantly alters dictators' payos and their payo-maximizing choice, dictators do not choose the selsh option more often. There is no treatment dierence in dictator choices.
In a second step, I investigate the social norms related to third-party punishment using the incentivized norm elicitation method proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013) in a separate experiment. Eliciting social norms is important for two reasons. Firstly, the social norms related to third-party punishment under full information, i.e., without moral wiggle room, have not been investigated in the literature before. The most important question in this context is whether punishing a selsh dictator is seen as being prosocial. The results make clear that punishment is indeed seen as the moral action. Secondly, I provide evidence regarding the social norms that prevail in a situation of initial ignorance. I show that the norm prescribes revealing the information about the dictator's choice. Hence, ignorance is not appropriate. I then explore two ways in which the social norms might still be in line with the choices observed. I do not nd that it is more or less appropriate to punish a norm violation depending on whether the information about the norm violation was revealed 3 or exogenously given. Contrarily, if a subject chooses to remain ignorant of the dictator's choice, then the social norm prescribes not punishing the dictator. And, little can be gained in terms of appropriateness by revealing the norm violation and punishing. This nding deviates from the result for the dictator game with hidden information about the recipient's payo and indicates why the possibility to remain ignorant might have a particularly strong impact on altruistic punishment.
In a third step, I explore why some subjects remain ignorant in order to avoid altruistic punishment. I follow two approaches. I rst investigate whether the choices observed in the experiment can be predicted on an aggregate level based on monetary payos and the measured social norms (see Figure 1) . A third party who reveals the information might observe a fair dictator, in which case both monetary and normative incentives are aligned, or a selsh dictator, in which case she faces a trade-o between punishing the dictator (which is costly, but appropriate) or not (which saves on income, but is inappropriate).
In contrast, for a third party who remains ignorant, not punishing is income-maximizing and not socially inappropriate. Depending on how strongly a third party weighs monetary incentives compared to adhering to the social norm, she hence might choose to remain ignorant and to not punish. Doing a similar exercise for all possible strategies of the third party, I nd that monetary incentives and social norms can well predict the distribution of choices. I then allow for observable heterogeneity between subjects and examine whether dierent choices can be explained by the subjects being of varying social types. Considering a measure of prosociality, I nd that the third parties who reveal a selsh dictator choice and choose to punish are the most prosocial. However, if I analyze punishment choices depending on whether third parties selected into receiving information on the norm violation or were exogenously informed of it, and if I consider a measure of self-image, I do not nd evidence of a sorting of types. Note: Figure 1 shows a stylized version of the game tree in the hidden information treatment including the income implied by and social appropriateness of the third party's actions.
In a nal step, I revisit the nding that dictator behavior does not vary across treatments.
Whether dictator behavior can be aected by the treatment variation is crucial, because no treatment dierence in dictator behavior implies a null-eect on norm compliance. In two additional treatments, the baseline informed treatment and the hidden information informed treatment, dictators are informed about the proportion of dictators that were punished conditional on their choice (selsh or fair) in the baseline and the hidden information treatment, respectively. I nd that when dictators have perfect information on the consequences of willful ignorance for punishment, dictators hold adjusted beliefs and behave signicantly more selshly when their choice is initially hidden.
The rst contribution of this study is to show that third-party punishment signicantly decreases if the third parties have the possibility to remain ignorant of a potential norm violation. This has important implications for future research and policy. Third-party punishment may not be as eective in enforcing social norms as previously thought, given that in a richer design that allows for avoiding information but leaves everything else unchanged, I no longer nd it to be very common. I provide evidence on the social appropriateness of altruistically punishing norm violations supporting the narrative about a socially appropriate punishment, which has been used, but not analyzed, in the literature on third-party punishment so far. I also provide evidence on the social norms that prevail in a situation in which there is initial uncertainty over whether a norm violation has taken place. Based on this, I explain why the possibility to remain ignorant reduces altruistic punishment by explaining choices based on norms and monetary incentives. Moreover, I analyze whether behavior under initial ignorance can be explained by individual characteristics (such as a subject's prosociality), which also allows testing theoretical predictions. Finally, I provide evidence showing that whether willful ignorance is likely to aect norm compliance depends on the salience of its eect to the dictators.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I briey discuss the related literature. In section 3, I describe the main experiment and its results. Section 4 analyzes the social norms in punishment behavior. Section 5 is dedicated to explaining choices. In section 6 the eect of providing information about punishment rates on norm compliance is studied. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Two existing studies consider moral wiggle room and altruistic punishment. Kriss et al. (2016) analyze the resoluteness of altruistic punishment. In the study, subjects rst make a punishment decision and are then asked to report the outcome of a die roll that determines whether the punishment is actually implemented. The study clearly shows that the decisions of third parties to punish norm violations are reluctant, they avoid actually implementing the costly punishment they previously intended. 4 A nice feature of the design of Kriss et al. (2016) is that it allows measuring the eect of moral wiggle room without the experimenter observing which subjects exploit the moral wiggle room. It hence provides a measure of the reluctance to altruistically punish that is not contaminated by the third parties' choices being observed by the experimenter. My study adds to Kriss et al. (2016) in four major respects. First, my nding that third-party punishment decreases through willful ignorance is consistent with the nding in Kriss et al. (2016) . Yet, while I analyze a dierent form of moral wiggle room such that there are a lot of real-life settings captured by the design of this study but not by the design of Kriss et al. (2016) , and vice versa, both studies also have very dierent policy implications. 6 In Kriss et al. (2016) subjects signal once to themselves that they are willing to punish norm violations.
7 While providing clean evidence of an eect of moral wiggle room on third-party punishment, the eect cannot be quantied in Kriss et al. (2016) , as a preference for being honest may cause third parties to not misreport the outcome of the dice roll.
6 and mine is that the willful ignorance involves dictators forgoing information (how their actions aect others), while I focus on third parties remaining ignorant (about the choices of others). Bartling et al. (2014) show that ignorant dictators are punished less than dictators who reveal the consequences of their actions (before implementing them) if their actions lead to an unfair outcome. Hence, combining the ndings from their study and mine might suggest that moving from a set-up of full information to a setting where the actors can remain ignorant, the frequency in which norm violations are punished is reduced via two dierent channels: Dictators who remain ignorant and violate a distributional norm are less often punished and third parties who can remain ignorant about the potential violation of a distributional norm punish less often.
My nding that people willfully ignore information to avoid a moral obligation corroborates the nding of Dana et al. (2007) and follow-up studies that people exploit ignorance as a form of moral wiggle room.
8 My results go beyond existing ndings by showing that people willfully ignore information about the behavior of others (instead of the outcome of random draws) and that this ignorance changes the amount of altruistic punishment (instead of generous giving), for which the welfare-enhancing eect is uncertain and lies in the future.
I hence show that willful ignorance generalizes to a setting that describes a more complex social interaction.
9 By analyzing whether specic types of subjects remain ignorant, my ndings bear on studies that explore whether there is a sorting of types in generosity decisions (Dana et al., 2007; Larson and Capra, 2009; Kajackaite, 2015; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017) . In this regard my ndings also relate to ndings showing that people actively avoid situations in which being generous is possible (Dana et al., 2006; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Lazear et al., 2012; Trachtman et al., 2015; Andreoni et al., 2017) .
By investigating how willful ignorance inuences third-party punishment, my ndings address a large body of literature analyzing the robustness of altruistic punishment (e.g., Charness et al., 2008; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Lewisch et al., 2011; Lotz et al., 2011; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011; Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012; Nikiforakis and Mitchell, 2014; Balafoutas et al., 2016; Goeschl and Jarke, 2016) .
10 These studies show that the extent of altruistic punishment strongly depends on its design as, for instance, the possibility of reward or retaliation. I can show that even a change in the information structure decreases altruistic punishment.
8 Similarly, van der Weele et al. (2014), Matthey and Regner (2015) and Regner (2018) study the extent to which forms of moral wiggle room other than willful ignorance aect negative and positive reciprocity.
9 Bartling et al. (2015) and Felgendreher (2018) nd that the possibility to avoid information does not have a strong impact on consumption decisions in markets.
10 Some studies provide evidence that altruistic punishment is aected by the diusion of responsibility of the dictator or the directness of his decisions (Coman, 2011; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Oexl and Grossman, 2013) .
7
Finally, my ndings also closely relate to previous studies on whether variations in social norms translate into variations in actual behavior and/or investigating norms under initial ignorance (e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013; Gächter et al., 2013; Gächter et al., 2017; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017; Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018) . I am the rst to document a norm for punishing selsh dictators as well as a strong norm for revealing information about whether a norm violation took place. I show that norms can help to explain altruistic punishment both under full information and when individuals have the possibility to remain ignorant.
3
Altruistic Punishment under Willful Ignorance
Experimental Design and General Procedures
The main experimental game is a modied version of the dictator game with third-party punishment (third-party punishment game; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) . It consists of two stages and three players: a dictator, a recipient, and a third party. In the rst stage, the dictator makes a binary decision that aects his income and the income of the recipient.
The dictator can either choose option A1 which gives him a high payo of e 6 but a low payo of e 1 to the recipient, or option A2 that gives him a lower payo of e 4 but leaves a higher payo of e 4 to the recipient. For now, I label option A1 the egoistic option and option A2 the fair option.
11 The third party is unaected by the dictator's decision and is informed that she receives e 6 as an endowment. This stage is the same in both treatments. The second stage diers between treatments. In the second stage of the baseline treatment the impartial third party immediately observes the dictator's action and can decide to punish the dictator (option C1) or not (option C2). In the second stage of the hidden information treatment, the third party does not observe the choice of the dictator, but can reveal it at no cost. Irrespective of whether the third party reveals the choice of the dictator, she can decide between options C1 and C2. In both the baseline and the hidden information treatment punishing reduces the payo of the third party by e 1 and that of the dictator by 11 The social norm elicitation in section 4 will suggest that this labeling is justied. Note that option A2
is also more ecient than option A1, as it implies a joint income of e 8 in stage 1 for the dictator and the recipient rather than a payo of e 7. e 3, but does not aect the payo of the recipient. Therewith, the third party's payo is e 5 (e 6) if she chooses (not) to punish the dictator.
Experimental subjects played the game only once in a between-subject design and in groups of three. The roles were labeled neutrally, that is, the dictator was called participant A, the recipient participant B, and the third party participant C. In order to obtain punishment decisions by two-thirds of the subjects, recipients and third parties played the game under role uncertainty, i.e., they were informed that they were either participant B or participant C and were asked to make their decision as participant C with their true roles assigned ex post. If assigned the role of a third party, their choice was implemented. If assigned the role of a receiver, their choice had no consequence.
12
To ease comparison with Dana et al. (2007) , I adapted several features of their design.
First, the decision-maker (the dictator in the study of Dana et al.; the third party in this study) decides between an egoistic choice that gives her e 6 or an altruistic choice, giving her e 5. Hence, the costs of the prosocial action and the decision-maker's potential incomes are the same. Second, the status quo of the decision is the same (inaction implies ignorance), which is likely to matter (see Grossman, 2014 and Cox et al., 2017) . Third, the framing regarding the revelation decision is almost identical.
Decisions were made anonymously on separated computer terminals. Instructions were provided on screen and with common information within each treatment. To ensure that the subjects understood the game, prior to making their decisions, subjects had to correctly answer an extensive set of control questions. They were also informed about the screens they would see during the game, depending on their own and other subjects' choices. Hence, the third parties in the hidden information treatment knew that if they did not reveal the choice of the dictator, they would avoid learning about his and the recipient's nal payos, as they would never be informed about them.
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the TU-WZB lab in Berlin. The recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) . The experiment was conducted in 10 sessions between December 2017 and February 2018. Two hundred and twenty-two subjects participated and, hence, I observe 148 third-party decisions (thereof 60 in the baseline treament and 88 in the hidden information treatment). About 95% of subjects were students. After the main experimental game was concluded, subjects were
shown new instructions described in sections 3.3 and 5.2. On average, each session lasted approximately 42 minutes and the average payment was e 13.43, with a range between e 8 12 It has been argued that eliciting third parties' punishment decision under role uncertainty does not inuence treatment eects (Bartling et al., 2014; Nikiforakis and Mitchell, 2014) . If there was an eect, for instance, by increasing the fraction of third parties who reveal the decision of the dictator, any treatment eect should be underestimated.
9 and e 18.
Third-Party Behavior
Thirty-six percent (or 32 out of 88) of the third parties deliberately remain uninformed and do not reveal the dictator's choice (see the left bar in Figure 2 ). This fraction is a bit lower than the 44% of dictators remaining ignorant in Dana et al. (2007) , but still sizable and even larger than the fraction of dictators remaining ignorant in Moradi and Nesterov (2017) (34%), which replicates Dana et al. (2007) using the same subject pool as I do shortly before my study took place. Does the fact that people remain ignorant inuence the rate at which selsh dictator choices are altruistically punished? Thirty-two percent of the third parties choose to punish an egoistic dictator in the hidden information treatment, but 61% of the third parties choose 13 Subjects who participated in Moradi and Nesterov (2017) were not invited to participate.
to punish an egoistic dictator in the baseline treatment (see also Figure 2 ). This reduction of 29 percentage points or 48% is statistically signicant at the 5% level (Fisher's exact test (FET), p=0.027). 14 Hence, although about two-thirds of subjects choose to punish altruistically if the information about the egoistic dictator behavior is readily made available, only one-third choose to do so if the information has to be revealed. Thus, the informational structure inuences third-party punishment.
15
The treatment eect is mainly driven by the fact that third parties who remain ignorant almost exclusively choose not to punish the dictator, as can be seen in 17 Studying the eect of counter-punishment opportunities on third-party punishment, Balafoutas et al.
(2014) nd that, although the opportunity to counter-punish reduces punishment, the proportion of norm violations is identical with and without counter-punishment.
After the game was completed, third-party beliefs about the average choices of the dictators were elicited. The third parties were asked to guess the percentage of dictators in the lab that had chosen option A1 (e 6 for participant A, e 1 for participant B). Substantial monetary incentives to report the beliefs truthfully were provided with a maximum additional payo of e 4. 18
The average belief about the percentage of dictators choosing selsh is virtually 50% (49.77%).
19 This is of interest, as third parties' willingness to reveal the dictators' choices might depend on the probabilities with which the dictators choose the two options. With this result, the probability of being in a conict of interest is close to the one in Dana et al. (2007) , where it is 50% by design.
20
If these beliefs dier between treatments, the observed treatment eects might not only be driven by changes in the information structure, but also by the fact that, for instance, third parties in the hidden information treatment expect dictators to choose the selsh option more often. To nd out whether third-party beliefs about the average dictator choice dier between treatments, I regress the belief about average dictator behavior on a treatment dummy, the actual choice of the dictator of the same group, and the interaction between the two. The coecient on the hidden information treatment is small and not statistically signicantly dierent from zero (eect size 5.70 percentage points, p=0.352). 21 Thus, the dierence in punishment rates between the baseline and the hidden information treatment is driven not by dierent expectations about dictators' decisions, but by the change in the information structure.
Social Norms in Punishment Behavior
To identify the social norms that prevail in third-party punishment, I conducted a second experiment with dierent experimental subjects using the incentivized elicitation method proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013) . In this way I obtain a social appropriateness rating for the actions of the third party for each of the four (six) possible choice combinations of the baseline treatment (hidden information treatment). I also obtain separate appropriate 18 I assess the beliefs about the average dictator behavior after subjects were informed of the outcome of the game, but as I observe the choices of the dictators I can control for its eect on average beliefs and even allow it to vary between treatments.
19 Observing a selsh dictator has a strong inuence on this belief: The average belief for thirds, who observed a selsh (fair) dictator is 67% (34%) (t-test, p <0.001).
20 There is mixed evidence on whether changes in this probability of conicting payos aect the rate of information avoidance (see van der Weele, 2014 and Moradi and Nesterov, 2017, but Feiler, 2014 The light gray bars in the left part of Figure 3 display the mean appropriateness ratings for each possible combination of choices (selsh or fair dictator choice on the one hand, and decision to punish or not on the other) in the baseline treatment. The large majority (88%) of subjects think punishing a selsh dictator is very or somewhat appropriate. If the dictator behaved fairly, it is very socially inappropriate to punish him. Hence, as expected, it is very inappropriate to punish a fair dictator and appropriate to punish a selsh dictator.
These results indicate that experimental subjects interpret the game as it is intended to be interpreted and nd it ethically correct to punish a selsh dictator. At the same time, the social norms vary with individual behavior.
22
Under hidden information, it is rst important to know whether revealing the information about the potentially selsh dictator choice is seen as the ethically correct thing to do. As the third party is revealing the moral choice of another subject in the laboratory, it could in fact be that it is more appropriate to mind one's own business. The social norm might even prescribe being a trusting person by remaining ignorant.
The right part of Figure 3 provides evidence that this is not the case. It shows the social appropriateness ratings for the information acquisition decision. While it is about somewhat inappropriate not to reveal, it is between somewhat and very appropriate to inform oneself about the dictator's choice (Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR-test), p<0.001). Hence, the 22 In fact, I can explore the extent to which the elicited norms can explain behavior by predicting the choice probabilities of the four choices in the baseline treatment based on the social appropriateness of the action and its monetary payo (see section 5.1 for a thorough discussion). I predict that upon observing a selsh dictator choice punishment will be chosen with a high probability (67%) and not punishing with a corresponding low probability (33%). Upon observing a fair dictator choice, I predict that not punishing will be chosen with a very high probability (99%) and punishment with a corresponding very low probability (1%). Hence, the predicted choice probabilities match the actual fraction of choices closely. At the same time, it makes sense that the social norms do not coincide with behavior, because the social norms elicited with the method proposed in Krupka and Weber (2013) are injunctive norms, that is, norms regarding what individuals ought to do and not necessarily what they actually do.
Figure 3: Mean appropriateness ratings by choice (combination) and treatment
Note: To the left, the gure shows the mean appropriateness rating of each choice combination for the baseline treatment (light gray) and the hidden information treatment (dark gray) and to the right the mean appropriateness rating of revealing the dictator's choice or remaining ignorant in the hidden information treatment.
norm prescribes revealing the dictator's choice.
Having established this, the crucial question becomes: What social norms prevail for altruistic punishment with the possibility of remaining ignorant? Two dierent mechanisms might explain the treatment eect. First, it could be that the fact that the third party does not immediately observe the choice of the dictator makes an egoistic dictator choice more excusable and, thus, punishing the dictator less appropriate. Then, punishing a selsh dictator should be dierently appropriated depending on whether the third party is initially informed about the behavior of the dictator or not or more generally, the appropriateness of the same choice combinations should dier between the baseline treatment, in which the information about the choice of the dictator was exogenously provided, and the hidden information treatment, in which the same information was endogenously revealed.
Looking again at the left part of Figure 3 , we see that the dark gray bars, which rep- to remain ignorant and to punish. Furthermore, I nd that not revealing the choice of the dictator and not choosing to punish is more appropriate than revealing that the dictator took the selsh option and not engaging in punishment (WSR-test, p<0.001), and revealing a norm violation and punishing is more appropriate than not revealing the choice of the dictator and not punishing (WSR-test, p<0.001). However, the dierence in the appropriateness of these latter two choice combinations is small and much smaller than between the equivalent choice combinations in the dictator game. And, almost half of the subjects (48%) nd it more or equally appropriate to remain ignorant and not to punish than to reveal a norm violation and to punish.
Summing these ndings up, it is not that the decision to punish is more or less appropriate 23 More precisely, if the third parties, on average, believe that dictators chose the selsh option, then it might be more appropriate to punish than to not punish, because the dictator is more likely selsh. In addition, it should matter whether it is more appropriate not to punish a selsh dictator than to punish a fair dictator. When making distributive choices, people seem to avoid false negatives (giving individuals more than they deserve), rather than false positives (giving individuals less than they deserve) (Cappelen et al., 2018) . To the degree that these preferences are a reection of social norms and to the degree to which they can be transferred to punishment decisions, the norm to punish a selsh dictator might be less strong than the norm not to punish a fair dictator. depending on whether one was exogenously informed about the dictator's choice or chose to inform oneself: If the dictator was egoistic, and one knows this, it is inappropriate not to punish her. In contrast, if one does not observe the choice of the dictator then i) the norm generally prescribes revealing the choice of the dictator, ii) if one does not acquire information about the dictator behavior there is a strong social norm not to punish, and iii) conditional on an egoistic dictator choice, little can be gained from revealing the information, as revealing this dictator choice and punishing is only slightly more socially appropriate than remaining ignorant and not punishing. These observations are unique for altruistic punishment and lead to remaining ignorant being an attractive outside option. Table 2 contains for each of the six choice combinations the predicted and the actual empirical proportion of third parties taking the choice combination. Consider, for example, the proportion of third parties revealing a selsh dictator choice and choosing not to punish.
The prediction is that this represents 14.10% of third parties, which comes close to the 18.18% who reveal a selsh dictator and do not punish him in the actual experiment. The same holds true for the other choice combinations. Hence, the predicted probabilities match the actual proportions of the choice combinations remarkably closely. Beyond that, predicting behavior based on norms and monetary payos also does a good job in predicting the proportion of third parties remaining ignorant (32.69% compared to 36.36% in the experimental data).
These ndings are especially striking given that the parameters I use for the predictions were obtained from dictator game choices. They imply that in the third-party punishment 25 For instance, to arrive at the prediction that 30.74% percent of third parties reveal the dictator's choice, observe a fair dictator choice and choose not to punish, I sum up the percentage of third parties who are predicted to choose the strategy reveal, do not punish a selsh dictator, and do not punish a fair dictator (25.76%) and who are predicted to choose the strategy reveal, punish a selsh dictator, and do not punish a fair dictator (35.71%), and multiply this by the empirical percentage of fair dictator choices in the hidden information treatment (50.00%).
game with the possibility of remaining ignorant, based on monetary payos, social norms, and the empirical distribution of dictator choices, quite accurate predictions on aggregate behavior can be made.
Finally, note that the preceding analysis depends on the social norms being both exogenous and homogeneous. However, it is possible that what an individual perceives as appropriate is biased in a self-serving way and, more generally, that norm perceptions of individuals are heterogeneous. That is, people might be able to convince themselves that it is appropriate to remain ignorant to diering degrees. In turn, the third parties who do not reveal the information might be those that are able to nd sucient excuses for their choice to remain ignorant and not to punish (mind your own business, etc.). This would imply that the norms that govern a subject's behavior are measured with (systematic) error and the predictive power of monetary incentives and social norms is even higher than presented here in Table 2 .
Sorting of Types
The preceding analysis explained dierent choices by a random utility component. An alternative approach is to pin down the individual level dierences that give rise to dierent choices and to analyze whether subjects who remain ignorant dier from those who reveal, or more broadly, whether there is a sorting of types into actions. A sorting of types is predicted 26 Thus, the third parties who reveal the dictator behavior should mostly be the high social types such that, conditional on revealing the choice of the dictator, the fraction of altruistic choices should be higher than the fraction of altruistic choices in the game with full information, as this average is taken over all individuals in the population.
27
An alternative approach is to directly measure the social type and the self-image type of subjects and analyze whether the average values of these measures follow the model's predictions. For the measure of social type, applying the model would imply that third 26 This requires the assumption that self-image concerns are also present for altruistic punishment.
27 As discussed before, an alternative approach for explaining dierences in choices is that third parties dier in their ability to bias their perception regarding how appropriate it is to remain ignorant.
parties who do not reveal the choice of the dictator are more prosocial than those who reveal that the dictator chose selshly and choose not to punish, but are less prosocial than those who reveal that the dictator chose selshly and choose to punish. Regarding self-image concerns, third parties who reveal that the dictator chose selshly and do not punish should care less about their self-image than those who reveal that the dictator chose selshly and choose to punish or than those who remain ignorant. 30 The measure is obtained by letting the subjects make choices between dierent allocations of money between themselves and another individual. It is higher the higher the concern a subject has for others.
The average social value orientation of third parties who reveal a selsh dictator and punish her is 35.52 and higher than for those who do not reveal the choice of the dictator (di: 5.56, MW-test, p=0.024). Equally, for third parties who reveal a selsh dictator and punish her, the index is higher than for those who reveal this information but refrain from making the costly punishment (di: 10.69, MW-test, p=0.001). Comparing the social value orientation between thirds who remain ignorant and thirds who reveal but do not punish, I nd that the former is marginally signicantly higher (MW-test, p=0.075). This result oers some support of the model of Grossman and van der Weele (2017) and, more generally, indicates that more prosocial types are more likely to punish norm violations.
As a measure of the importance of self-image I again follow Grossman and van der Weele (2017) in using Aquino and Reed's (2002) measure of self-importance of moral identity.
28 Note that there is mixed evidence of sorting in generosity decisions, as there is signicant sorting into revealing in Grossman and van der Weele (2017) but not in Dana et al. (2007) , Larson and Capra (2009) and Kajackaite (2015) .
29 If the selsh type reveals and the share of the selsh type is suciently large, prosocial behavior may actually be lower among those who reveal (see Grossman and van der Weele, 2017) . 30 I obtained this measure of social value orientation for 93 of the subjects.
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The measure is based on asking individuals to indicate their agreement to six statements about the importance of certain moral characteristics for their sense of self. The attributes I consider match the attributes of someone who is willing to engage in altruistic punishment and are hence compassionate, caring, and fair. I create a linear index taking on values between 0 and 30 with higher values indicating a higher self-importance of moral identity.
The reported self-image concerns of third parties who reveal that the dictator opted for the selsh choice and sanction her are not dierent to those who reveal that the dictator opted for the selsh choice and do not sanction her (MW-test, p=0.930) or to those who remain ignorant (MW-test, p=0.734). Thus, there is no evidence that third parties who reveal the information and then act selshly care less about their self-image than third parties who reveal the information and behave altruistically or than those who do not reveal. 
34
When dictators are fully informed about the consequences of willful ignorance for altruistic punishment there is a sizable treatment dierence in dictator behavior of 51%. The majority of dictators in the baseline select the fair option (62%) and the majority of dictators under hidden information choose the selsh option (70%) (FET, p = 0.003). In line with the notion of third parties holding accurate beliefs under full information (baseline treatment) but struggling to anticipate the eects of initially hiding the information about whether a norm violation has taken place (hidden information treatment), dictators in the baseline informed treatment do not signicantly respond to the information provided (di. to baseline treatment: 9pp, FET, p = 0.481), while dictators in the hidden information informed treatment adapt their choices substantially (di. to hidden information treatment: 20 pp, FET, p = 0.081).
Dictators in both treatments hold the same beliefs about the proportion of fair dictators 31 The results of these treatments are not obvious, because i) it is unclear what fraction of dictators who chose the fair option in the original sessions did so due to their social preferences, ii) the elasticity of dictators'
beliefs with respect to the information is unknown, and iii) dictators' risk-preferences are unknown.
32 Hence, the information was provided in a natural way. Assuming that the dictators do not leave money on the table to act in accordance with an experimenter demand when beliefs are elicited, I can check whether a dierence in dictator behavior goes along with a dierence in beliefs rather than being driven by an experimenter demand eect. 33 I did not elicit the beliefs at the start, because eliciting beliefs itself may or may not aect behavior and I intended to measure the causal eect of the information on dictator behavior (see Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008), but Ková°ík (2007) and Gächter and Renner (2010) ).
34 These are about the same numbers as in the hidden information treatment, which I aimed for.
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being punished (10.71% in the baseline informed treatment, 11.12% in the hidden information informed treatment, t-test, p = 0.915), but dier with respect to their beliefs about the proportion of selsh dictators being punished (63.40% and 37.30%, t-test, p < 0.001). As a consequence, the fraction of dictators that should choose the fair option if maximizing the expected value of their payments and responding optimally to their beliefs is 49% in the baseline and 2% in the hidden information (FET, p < 0.001). I also elicit beliefs about the proportion of punished dictators conditional on their choice from third parties.
35 For these, I do not nd any dierence in the beliefs about the proportion of selsh dictators being punished (t-test, p = 0.514). Hence, the third parties do not anticipate the treatment eect, which is in line with the original nding of dictators without information behaving in the same way across treatments.
Analyzing third-party behavior, I nd overall smaller levels of third-party punishment.
Twelve out of 34 third parties punish under full information, only 14 out of 60 do so under hidden information. This leads to a treatment dierence of 34%. Due to the fact that the punishment level is lower this dierence is not statistically signicant on conventional levels (FET, p = 0.237). 36 As in the original sessions, ignorant third parties almost never punish. 37
These additional treatments hence generate two takeaways. First, if dictators are perfectly informed about the likelihood of being punished as they might be at least in some dynamic settings that allow for repeated interactions moral wiggle room aects norm compliance. Second, whether moral wiggle room aects norm compliance in any given set-up is likely to depend on the salience of its eect. In particular, in set-ups in which the outcome of interest is only indirectly linked to an individual having the possibility to exploit the wiggle room, we might expect the eect of moral wiggle room to be muted.
35 Remember that the third parties do not receive any information about previous punishment behavior.
They are, however, informed about the proportion of dictators choosing selshly in their treatment.
36 This might be caused by third parties who engage in punishment believing that a high fraction of dictators are fair. Learning about approximately 50% of dictators being selsh might then discourage punishment.
Accordingly, third parties who punish selsh dictators in the original sessions believe that the fraction of selsh dictators is lower than third parties who do not (di.: 21 pp, t-test, p < 0.001). In addition, the beliefs about the fraction of selsh dictators vary slightly between the baseline informed and the hidden information informed treatment (di.: 6 pp, t-test, p = 0.027), which might also contribute to the result.
37 If I pool the data of the baseline treatment and the baseline informed treatment, and the hidden information treatment and the hidden information informed treatment, respectively, the treatment eect is 20 percentage points or 42% and highly statistically signicant (FET, p = 0.011). Forty-eight percent of third parties remain ignorant. Across both treatments only three out of 82 third parties punish a fair dictator.
7 Conclusion
Obscuring information about choice-relevant behavior decreases altruistic punishment. More than a third of subjects remain ignorant about how a dictator chooses to allocate money between himself and a passive recipient. The ignorant third parties exploit the moral wiggle room provided by the information structure and act as if no norm violation has taken place.
They comply with social norms that consider it malicious to punish a dictator without knowing how she behaved and that consider it okay to remain ignorant and not punish. As a consequence, if third parties can remain ignorant about the behavior of the dictator, less than one-third of norm violations are altruistically punished. This implies that in situations in which people can remain ignorant about potential norm violations, it is likely that norm violations remain unpunished.
The present study remains silent about what constitutes an optimal level of punishment.
It might be that the punishment rate under full information is in fact too high in the sense that the desired proportion of moral behavior could be sustained with lower punishment rates. In this regard, even more important than whether willful ignorance impacts third-party punishment seems to be the question of whether it aects dictator behavior (i.e., the norm it is supposed to enforce). While dictator behavior is not aected by the potential willful ignorance of the third party when no information about its consequences for punishment rates is given, it does when information is provided. I analyze a rather extreme change in the information provided. Hence, in scenarios where the salience of its eect is low, the eect of willful ignorance on norm compliance might be small. At the same time, when the equivalent information is given to third parties, punishment levels and the eect of willful ignorance on punishment are lower, indicating that willful ignorance can only become eective in scenarios where there is substantial moral behavior to begin with.
From a policy perspective, providing people with the possibility to reveal choice-relevant information might be insucient to induce desirable punishment behavior and, in turn, to sustain certain norms of distribution or cooperation or, more generally, moral behavior. If sustaining a certain behavior is of high importance, exogenously providing information in a way that enforces that people process the information and ensuring that the consequences of violating a norm are known is highly advisable.
38 At the same time, as observed choices seem to be in line with the elicited social norms, a public discussion on how to judge deliberate ignorance might be benecial. In this regard, recent discussions about whistleblowing and ethical misconduct within companies can be considered a step in the right direction.
38 More broadly, whether an exogenous information provision is benecial also depends on other economic considerations, such as the monitoring costs or the costs of punishment relative to the benets of sustaining a norm.
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